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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is concerned with a type of tour package businesses referring to as “zero-fare” group 
tours. The terminology of “zero-fare” group tours was coined exclusively in the Chinese context 
and has been widely used in the industry to describe a relationship of sharing tour fares between 
wholesale travel agents (WTAs) and inbound tour operators (ITOs), indicating that the former, 
in principle, transfers no tour fares downward to the latter for service arrangements. The 
fundamental proposition in this study is that the problem of “zero-fare” group tours is quality 
deterioration which is arguably the consequence of information asymmetries. This proposition 
can be justified by referring to three prominent features of services and package tours in 
particular, namely intangibility, heterogeneity, and inseparability of production and 
consumption, which have been extensively researched but not yet in relation to information 
asymmetry. Evidence is presented for a preliminary validation of this proposition and the 
associated hypotheses.   
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Package tours have represented the dominant international travel mode in the aftermath 
of the Second World War and today are the largest travel business worldwide. The business of 
package tours has nevertheless witnessed severe quality problems in various forms including 
information misrepresentation (Sheldon, 1986), tour operators’ default on contract (Atherton, 
1994; Elton, 1984; Grant, 1996; Reece, 2009), and cheating tourists at the destination (Jia, 2004; 
Keating, 2009; Prideaux, et al., 2006). Among the most prominent of these are the so-called 
“zero-fare” group tours (Jia, 2004; Zhang, Heung, and Yan, 2009). This terminology was 
exclusively coined in the Chinese context and has been widely used in the industry to describe a 
relationship of sharing tour fares between wholesale travel agents (WTAs) and inbound tour 
operators (ITOs), indicating that the former, in principle, transfers no tour fares downward to the 
latter for service arrangements. Such a relationship is remarkably in contrast with the one in the 
normal business model in which WTAs and ITOs share tour fares on a pre-negotiated 
proportional basis. Quality deterioration of this kind which is characterized by the “zero-fare” 
relation refers to as the problem of “zero-fare” group tours in the present study. 
 
Theoretical analysis of this problem has proceeded by examining, first, the market 
structure of both the generating market and the destination (e.g., Dwyer, King, and Prideaux, 
2007; King, Dwyer, and Prideaux, 2006; Prideaux, et al., 2006) and, second, the pricing 
strategies taken by WTAs in the generating market (Zhang, et al., 2009). The first line of the 
research contends that WTAs are advantageous over ITOs in a way of controlling tourist flows 
from the generating market to the destination and can thus squeeze profits from the supply chain; 
in response, ITOs may reduce costs by cutting service quality at the destination because the low 
tour fares transferred by WTAs are insufficient for recouping profits. Plausible evidence for this 
argument can be found in Australia’s inbound tourism from China and South Korea where tourist 
flows originated largely underpin the tourism development of Australia (Dwyer, et al., 2007; 
King, et al., 2006; Prideaux, et al., 2006). The second line simply views the business of “zero-
fare” group tours as a type of pricing strategies, such as penetration pricing, by which WTAs can 
dramatically expand their market share especially when an off-peak season is in presence; and 
sustaining low price by cutting quality is arguably optimal for both WTAs and ITOs at least in a 
short-term (Zhang, et al., 2009).   
 
Previous research has not acknowledged the complex of package tours as credence 
qualities which are characterized by a large amount of information asymmetries (see Darby and 
Karni, 1973). The fundamental proposition of this study is that the problem of “zero-fare” group 
tours is the consequence of information asymmetries involved in the transactions between 
tourists, WTAs and ITOs. This proposition can be justified by referring to three prominent 
features of package tours as a bundle of services, namely intangibility, heterogeneity, and 
inseparability of production and consumption, which have been extensively researched but not 
yet in relation to information asymmetry. The relation as this study argues is that these three 
features impede information dissemination from tour operators to tourists. Tourists are, as a 
matter of fact, asymmetrically ill-informed throughout the trip, either when transacting with 
WTAs in the generating market or when being supplied by ITOs at the destination. Theories of 
information asymmetry are expected to provide a best way forward to model the problem of 
  
“zero-fare” group tours.  
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This section presents a concise review of economic studies on both information 
asymmetry and reputation, which lay out the theoretical foundation of the present study. A set of 
working hypotheses that follow are proposed in relation to applications of information 
asymmetry and reputation in the marketing literature, suggesting that information asymmetry is 
the cause of quality deterioration while reputation can mitigate the impact of information 
asymmetry and thereby alleviating quality deterioration to some extent. This section articulates 
three prominent relationships that underpin the theoretical model of the present study, namely the 
relationships between information asymmetry and quality, reputation and quality, and 
information asymmetry and reputation. 
2.1 Information Asymmetry and Reputation 
The idea of information asymmetry was proposed as economists realized that information 
is actually incomplete or imperfect in the market (Hayek, 1945; Stigler, 1961; Stiglitz, 1989). 
Without this recognition the economic problems, as Hayek (1945) puts it, will be simplified to a 
purely mathematical calculation in nature. The significance of imperfect information as in the 
scope of the present study, however, does not lie in its contribution to economic studies in 
general, but in its fundamental role in explaining quality deterioration. The probability of quality 
being deteriorated is simply because quality might be misrepresented or underprovided by sellers 
who have an informational advantage over buyers (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1977). In other words, 
it is impossible for sellers to misrepresent information or underprovide quality provided that the 
buyers possess equal amount of information as the sellers do, that is, no information asymmetry 
between buyers and sellers. Information asymmetry is arguably the paramount cause of quality 
deterioration and the market failure (Akerlof, 1970; Darby and Karni, 1973; Greif, 1993; Stiglitz, 
1989). 
 
The concept of reputation has long been modeled as a market mechanism to alleviate 
information asymmetry and thus functions to sustain quality (Allen, 1984; Klein and Leffler, 
1981; Rogerson, 1983; Shapiro, 1982, 1983; Stiglitz, 1989; Tadelis, 1999). The role that 
reputation plays is to both provide incentives to sellers in the form of price premiums and 
disclose quality information to buyers, the latter of which can help to reduce information 
asymmetry on the buyer’s side. This is because reputable sellers need to distinguish themselves 
from low-quality sellers in a means of disseminating information to buyers for increasing repeat 
purchase. Reputation therefore not only indicates that sellers have committed to high-quality 
provision but also suggests a mechanism of information signaling (Klein and Leffler, 1981). This 
signaling mechanism may specifically suggest that high prices indicate high qualities if sellers 
devote to supplying high quality for reputation building (Shapiro, 1983).  
2.2 Hypotheses 
Theories of information and reputation have underscored a set of four inter-connected 
constructs, that is, asymmetric information, reputation, price, and quality. Prior to presenting the 
 hypotheses, we operationalize these four constructs in the package tour context as to include 
WTA-level asymmetric information, ITO-level asymmetric information, WTAs’ reputation, 
ITOs’ reputation, price sensitivity, and service performance. We propose an idea of production 
technology by which tour operators (WTAs) package a number of service components for 
producing tour packages. Production technology is inaccessible to tourists and thus represents 
WTA-level asymmetric information between tourists and WTAs. Effort that ITOs exert in 
delivering service represents ITO-level asymmetric information between tourists and ITOs. We 
distinguish between WTAs’ reputation and ITOs’ reputation to be consistent with the roles that 
WTAs play for providing information in the generating market and ITOs play for supplying 
services at the destination, respectively.  
2.2.1 Asymmetric Information, Price Sensitivity, and Service Performance 
Buyers commonly use price as an indicator of quality, especially when they have little 
access to product information (Goldsmith and Newell, 1997). This suggests that price sensitivity 
has an inverse relationship with information available to buyers especially regarding product 
characteristics other than price. For instance, Tellis and Gaeth (1990) found that buyers tended to 
be price-seeking or price-averse as their uncertainty about product quality increased, indicating 
that the availability of quality information affects price sensitivity. However, price information 
might be negatively related to price sensitivity for some products which involve a large amount 
of asymmetric information (Parker, 1995). As buyers can costlessly access to price rather than 
quality information, they tend to make their decisions solely on price, and further, to search the 
lowest price. On the other hand, well-informed buyers are less likely to make price-quality 
inferences because they can make their choices based on quality information rather than price. 
The hypothesis is therefore formalized in the package tour context as:  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Tourists’ awareness of production technology negatively affects their price 
sensitivity. 
 
The improved information on the buyer’s side might result in a reduction of quality 
deterioration and cheating (Darby and Karni, 1973; Jin and Leslie, 2003; Nelson, 1970; Shapiro, 
1983). This reflects an intuitive belief amongst economists that imperfect information is a cause 
of quality deterioration. Jin and Leslie (2003) found, in the case of food quality, that food 
hygiene was improved after customers were informed about hygiene grade in restaurants. 
Specifically, after the restaurants being researched were required to publicly display the hygiene 
grade cards in their windows, hygiene quality improvements were observed in terms of the 
increased restaurant health inspection scores, sensitivity of demands to hygiene quality, and the 
decreased foodborne illness. Evidence was also found in the online auctions where the buyers 
and the sellers had no actual interaction when the transaction was undertaking; the buyers 
exclusively relied on the comments about the sellers left by others to judge quality (Melnik and 
Alm, 2002). The relationship between asymmetric information and quality can be hypothesized 
as:  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Tourists’ awareness of ITOs’ effort positively affects service performance. 
2.2.2 Reputation, Price Sensitivity, and Service Performance 
  
A positive relationship between quality and reputation has been verified not only in 
theory (Hörner, 2002; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983) but also in a number of empirical 
studies especially in relation to the online auctions (e.g., Houser and Wooders, 2006; Resnick, et 
al., 2006). Reputation theories ascertain that price premium is necessary and sufficient for high 
quality production (Allen, 1984; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). The price premium 
interpreted on the buyer’s side is that buyers are more willing to pay higher prices for high-
quality products. In other words, buyers are less price sensitive when they are aware that they are 
purchasing high qualities. This assertion also applies in the tourism context, suggesting that 
tourists who are motivated by quality and reputation are reconciled to paying more both at the 
destination and in the generating market (Alegre and Juaneda, 2006). To explore the impact of 
reputation on price sensitivity across a range of products, Erdem, Swait, and Louviere’s (2002) 
study revealed a significantly negative relationship between the two, ceteris paribus. It is 
therefore reasonable to propose the hypotheses below:  
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): WTAs’ reputation negatively affects tourists’ price sensitivity. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): ITOs’ reputation positively affects service performance. 
 
Of particular interest is that whether price competition will lead to lower quality outputs 
when consumers cannot observe quality costlessly. A lot of professions such as doctors, lawyers, 
and optometrists have held that price information should not be made available at a low cost to 
customers, even if such information is relatively inexpensive to provide (Parker, 1995; Rogerson, 
1988). Also, professional organizations have urged prohibition of any advertising based on price. 
This is because disclosing price information under such circumstances might result in price 
sensitivity when quality is unobservable; low-quality sellers might advertise more (Kranton, 
2003). Buyers who were loyal to higher quality brands were found to be less price sensitive than 
those who were loyal to lower quality brands (Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar, and Raj, 1992). This 
indicates that low price sensitivity may be associated with high quality brands. The hypothesis is 
thus proposed as: 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Tourists’ price sensitivity negatively affects service performance.  
2.2.3 Asymmetric Information and Reputation  
The positive relationship between reputation and information is definite and well 
acknowledged as reputation itself is a signaling device of information (Allen, 1984; Klein and 
Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). Rogerson (1983) stated that, when the effect of reputation is in 
presence, high-quality sellers have more buyers than their counterparts because the positive 
word-of-mouth communication from the incumbent buyers may result in more new and repeat 
arrivals. Rob and Fishman (2005) confirmed a positive relationship between reputation and 
consumer base, concluding that reputation is more valuable to a firm the larger its customer base 
is. Reputation can speed information searching, save searching cost and, as a result, increase 
consumer knowledge (Mailath and Samuelson, 2001). Buyers who can obtain more information 
from the sellers tended to believe that the sellers have built up reputation, because as List (2006) 
argues reputation cannot work to sustain quality without buyers’ knowledge about the sellers. 
Two hypotheses are proposed as  
  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Tourists’ awareness of production technology positively affects WTAs’ 
reputation; and 
 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Tourists’ awareness of effort positively affects ITOs’ reputation; 
 
and by linking WTAs and ITOs in a joint production in operating package tour businesses we 
propose  
 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Tourists’ awareness of production technology positively affects their 
awareness of effort.  
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
We devised a cross-sectional survey to collect data for testing these hypotheses. This 
model requires tracking tourists’ purchase and consumption from the generating market to the 
destination as information asymmetries are presented in sequence between tourists and WTAs, 
denoted by production technology, and between tourists and ITOs, denoted by effort. Data 
collection consisted of two parts. In the first part, we collected data regarding production 
technology, WTAs’ reputation, and price sensitivity in the generating market; and in the second 
part, we collected data with respect to effort, ITOs’ reputation, and service performance at the 
destination.  
3.1 Measurement 
The measurement was accomplished by resting on the theories that highlight these 
constructs as well as by taking account the context of package tours. The selection of exact items 
for each construct followed one of the two principles. First, items that measure a construct were 
identified and selected based on a set of individual service components that constitute a tour 
package, each of which was associated with the definition of the construct. This included the 
measurement of production technology and service performance. Second, items were selected by 
highlighting the essence of the construct itself while referring to the context under consideration, 
which included the measurement of WTAs’ reputation, ITOs’ reputation, price sensitivity, and 
effort. A total of 37 items were identified and rephrased in the statements adapting to the context 
of package tours. 
 
A tourist-completed questionnaire was used for data collection. It consisted of four 
sections including tourists’ previous travel experiences and travel-related characteristics, the 
present purchase experience, consumption, and demographics. Information regarding tourists’ 
purchase experience was summarized by three constructs which are production technology, 
WTAs’ reputation, and price sensitivity while tourists’ consumption was summarized by the 
other three constructs which are effort, ITOs’ reputation, and service performance. These six 
constructs were measured by a total of 37 items structured on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 to 7, indicating respondents’ level of agreement from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
Demographics was obtained by requiring tourists to providing information of their gender, age, 
marital status, education, occupation, and monthly income.  
  
3.2 Data Collection 
The population consisted of Mainland Chinese tourists who took group package tours to 
Hong Kong over the period of data collection. Specifically, we restricted the empirical setting to 
the Shenzhen-Hong Kong market; those Mainland Chinese tourists departed from Shenzhen to 
Hong Kong were sampled. A convenient sampling method was employed to select respondents 
who were eighteen years old or above. Data were collected with assistance from the tour escorts 
who were responsible for distributing and collecting the questionnaires. Since in the business 
contexts WTAs normally dispatch at least one tour escort for each tour package to accompany 
tourists throughout the trip, tour escorts can conveniently approach to and contact tourists and, as 
a result, may obtain a relatively high response rate. This survey was thus administered by tour 
escorts and completed in October 2010. A total of 201 questionnaires were distributed in nine 
tour packages, to each of which was allocated approximate 15 to 40 questionnaires, and 192 in 
total were checked useful for data analysis.   
3.3 Data Analysis 
Data analysis primarily consisted of a test for the measurement model and a test for the 
structural model. For testing the measurement model we carried out an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) on a total of eighteen items after data screening to assess whether the factor 
structure proposed in theory can be verified against the data. A principal component analysis 
with Varimax was used for extracting and rotating factors; instead of extracting factors with an 
eigenvalue greater than one we fixed the number of the extracted factors to six as being expected 
in theory, as the former criteria were unable to derived a six-factor structure. A confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) was then used to assess whether the proposed measurement model fitted 
the data. A couple of goodness-of-fit indices including χ2, χ2/df, the comparative fit index (CFI), 
the non-normed fit index (NNFI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
were used for this assessment. The structural model was assessed by the aforementioned 
goodness-of-fit indices; and the strength and significance of path relations was examined for 
testing the hypotheses. SPSS Statistics 17.0 and AMOS 17.0 Graphics were used to conduct the 
above analysis.   
 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Testing for the Measurement model 
An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to check whether these six 
constructs—production technology (PT), WTAs’ reputation (WTAR), price sensitivity (PS), 
effort (EF), ITOs’ reputation (ITOR), and service performance (SP)—were distinct against the 
data. Both Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) of .879 and Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity of 2080.187 (p < .001) suggested that the EFA was appropriate for the data 
(Table 1). Results of EFA approximately confirmed a six-factor structure in the theoretical model. 
The construct of production technology among others explained the largest of 16.63% variance 
with all factor loadings above .70; the constructs of WTAs’ reputation, effort, service 
performance, ITOs’ reputation, price sensitivity were also detected as distinct with all factor 
loadings above .60, explaining, respectively, 12.80%, 12.62%, 11.42%, 10.17%, and 9.97% of 
 the variance (Table 1). Reliability of the instrument was examined by calculating Cronbach’s α 
for each construct to assess internal consistency. Cronbach’s α of these constructs ranged 
from .71 to .89 which was above the suggested cutoff point of .70 (e.g., Nunnally, 1978), 
indicating a high level of internal consistency for each construct and thus an acceptable 
reliability (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 Exploratory factor analysis of the instrument 
 
Factors Factor 
Loading 
Eigenvalue  Communality Variance 
explained 
Cronbach’s 
α 
F1: Production technology  7.456  16.63 .87 
Price proportion for 
meal 
.858  .782   
Price proportion for 
sightseeing 
.773  .698   
Price proportion for 
recreation 
.761  .650   
Price proportion for 
shopping 
.755  .708   
Price proportion for 
accommodation 
.726  .639   
 F2: WTAs’ reputation  2.462  12.80 .89 
Credibility 
.832  .867   
Reliability 
.823  .814   
Trustworthiness 
.704  .772   
 F3: Effort  1.562  12.62 .71 
Acceptable behavior 
.826  .790   
Reasonable effort 
.791  .786   
Consistent behavior 
.701  .721   
F4: Service performance  1.332  11.42 .85 
Shopping service 
.798  .753   
Leisure activities 
.775  .751   
Meals 
.730  .693   
F5: ITOs’ reputation  1.061  10.17 .83 
Competitiveness  
.808  .770   
Expertise  
.687  .763   
Professionalism 
.661  .758   
F6: Price sensitivity  .848  9.97 .80 
Price seeking 
.780  .718   
Price consciousness  
.764  .648   
Price-orientation 
.761  .640   
Notes: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is of .879, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is of 
2080.187, df = 190, p < .001. 
 
The measurement model was tested by carrying out a confirm factor analysis (CFA) to 
  
assess whether the proposed measurement model fitted the data. A couple of goodness-of-fit 
indices including χ2, χ2/df, CFI, NNFI, and RMSEA were used for this assessment. Results of 
CFA showed that the measurement model was parsimonious and satisfactory given its acceptable 
goodness-of-fit indices (χ2 = 243.113, df = 155, χ2/df = 1.568, p < .001, CFI = .96, NNFI = .95, 
RMSEA = .06) (Table 2). Average variance extracted (AVE) was calculated to assess convergent 
and discriminant validity of the constructs. An AVE below the suggested .50 (e.g., Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981) was found for price sensitivity with .46, suggesting insufficient valid variance 
explained by its measurement and thus was little of validity; AVEs of other five constructs 
ranged from .57 to .74, indicating satisfactory convergent validity (Table 2). AVE for each 
construct was higher than the squared correlation coefficients for corresponding inter-constructs, 
which confirmed discriminant validity (Table 2).    
 
Table 2 Inter-construct correlations, average variance extracted and model fit 
 
Constructs F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
F1: PT 1.00      
F2: WTAR 0.43 (.18) 1.00     
F3: EF 0.37 (.14) 0.64 (.41) 1.00    
F4: SP 0.36 (.13) 0.58 (.34) 0.61 (.37) 1.00   
F5: ITOR 0.38 (.14) 0.73 (.53) 0.74 (.55) 0.57 (.32) 1.00  
F6: PS 0.43 (.18) 0.41 (.17) 0.31 (.10) 0.35 (.12) 0.25 (.06) 1.00 
       
AVE .57 .74 .66 .58 .63 .46 
       
Model fit indices       
χ
2
 =  243.113 df = 155 p < .001    
χ
2/df = 1.568      
CFI .96      
NNFI .95      
RMSEA .06      
Notes: PT = Production technology, WTAR = WTAs’ reputation, EF = Effort, SP = Service performance, 
ITOR = ITOs’ reputation, PS = Price sensitivity. 
4.2 Testing for the Structural Model 
The structural equation model (SEM) was tested to verify the proposed hypotheses. A set 
of goodness-of-fit indices were employed to assess the structural model in terms of its parsimony 
and the degree to which the theoretical model fitted the data. The goodness-of-fit indices (χ2 = 
341.348, df = 162, p < .001, χ2/df = 2.107, CFI = .91; NNFI = .89, RMSEA = .08) indicated that 
the structural was parsimonious and achieved a moderate good fit for the model (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 Path estimates for the structural equation model 
 
Paths Estimate S.E. Critical ration p-value 
    H6: PT → WTAR .401 .068 5.934 *** 
    H1: PT → PS .203 .064 3.165 .002 
    H8: PT → EF .338 .064 5.293 *** 
    H7: EF → ITOR .601 .078 7.675 *** 
     H2: EF → SP .362 .124 2.916 .004 
    H3: WTAR → PS .186 .070 2.650 .008 
    H4: ITOR → SP .281 .151 1.854 .064 
    H5: PS → SP .241 .098 2.449 .014 
     
Model fit indices     
    χ
2
 341.348 df = 162 p < .001  
    χ
2/df 2.107    
    CFI .91    
    NNFI .89    
    RMSEA .08    
Notes: PT = Production technology, WTAR = WTAs’ reputation, EF = Effort, SP = Service performance, 
ITOR = ITOs’ reputation, PS = Price sensitivity. 
*** denotes p < .001. 
 
Results of path estimates showed that production technology had significant effects on 
WTAs’ reputation (coefficient = .401, p < .001), price sensitivity (coefficient = .203, p < .05), and 
effort (coefficient = .338, p < .001). This supported the hypotheses H6, H1, and H8, respectively. 
Effort had significant effects on both ITOs’ reputation (coefficient = .601, p < .001) and service 
performance (coefficient = .362, p < .05) which supported the hypotheses H7 and H2. WTAs’ 
reputation had significant effect on price sensitivity (coefficient = .186, p < .05) in the generating 
market but this effect was positive, which contradicted to that was hypothesized; whereas the 
effect of ITOs’ reputation on service performance (coefficient = .281, p > .05) was not significant. 
This supported the hypothesis H3 while rejected H4. As it was expected price sensitivity had 
significant effect on service performance (coefficient = .241, p < .05) and thus supported the 
hypothesis H5. Of particular importance were the two lines of asymmetric information—
production technology and effort. Both were evident in explaining the endogenous constructs in 
the model as they had relative high path loadings on such endogenous constructs as WTAs’ 
reputation and ITOs’ reputation. 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Preliminary evidence of this study has validated the fundamental proposition that the 
problem of “zero-fare” group tours is the consequence of information asymmetries. The 
hypotheses are supported because the relationship between production technology and price 
sensitivity and between effort and service performance are statistically significant. It is evident 
that information and quality is closely related especially in a product complex such as package 
tours. The effect of reputation on quality is not as evident as being indicated by the theories, and 
the reason might be that reputation cannot function without information (List, 2006). That is, the 
presence of asymmetric information not only affects quality but also impedes reputation from 
functioning in sustaining quality. This can explain why severe quality problems such as “zero-
fare” group tours were found in the package tour industry. 
5.1 Information on Quality 
We conceptualize information in this study as to include both asymmetric information 
and reputation. Asymmetric information is operationalized as production technology on the 
  
WTA’s side and effort on the ITO’s side, respectively. Reputation can signal quality through 
reducing asymmetric information between tourists and both WTAs and ITOs. Results of this 
study have supported the proposition that information asymmetry is the cause of quality 
deterioration in the context of package tours. This proposition is verified by two hypotheses H1 
and H2, suggesting a significantly positive relationship between tourists’ knowledge of 
production technology and price sensitivity in the generating market, and between tourists’ 
knowledge of effort and service performance at the destination. It states specifically that tourists 
turn out to be price sensitive in the generating market when they know little about production 
technology and are more likely to be served with low quality at the destination when they know 
less about effort.  
 
The signaling effect of reputation is evident in the generating market as suggested by the 
hypothesis H3, which indicates a significantly positive relationship between WTAs’ reputation 
and tourists’ price sensitivity. Nevertheless, this contradicts with the reputation theories in which 
reputation should commend a price premium, indicating that high quality should be charged with 
a relatively high price (Allen, 1984; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983). On the consumer’s 
side, it simply suggests that tourist’ are more willing to pay for a package tour sold by a 
particular tour operator if they believe the tour operator is reputable. We failed to detect a 
significant relationship between ITOs’ reputation and service performance as being predicted by 
the theories. The reasons may be largely attributed to the unreliable measurement of the 
constructs, in particular regarding effort and ITOs’ reputation. We actually to some extent failed 
to uncover the factor structure of effort and ITOs’ reputation by an EFA in extracting those 
factors with an eigenvalue greater than one. The effect of ITOs’ reputation might thus have been 
biased to that of effort.  
5.2 Information and Reputation 
The effect of information on reputation is of particular significance and importance in 
this study. This effect is specified as the causal relationships between production technology and 
WTAs’ reputation and between effort and ITOs’ reputation. Verification of these two hypotheses 
suggests that tourists tend to perceive tour operators as having reputation if they can access to 
production technology and effort. When it comes to the signaling effect of reputation, this 
finding implies that a reputable tour operator is more likely to disseminate relevant information 
to tourists, one purpose of which is to distinguish itself from those supplying low quality (e.g., 
Shapiro, 1982, 1983). In the package tour industry, this signaling effect can be interpreted as that 
WTAs with established reputation in the generating market tend to inform tourists of the service 
components that are packaged as well as the proportions that these components individually 
account for in the tour package as a whole. This line of information is precisely production 
technology that is possessed entirely by WTAs when no reputation effect is in presence.   
 
The roles of WTAs and ITOs in the package tour businesses are distinct as the former 
primarily focuses on selling package tours to tourists and the latter on delivering services. The 
signaling effect of ITOs’ reputation differs from WTAs’ reputation. That is, ITOs with 
established reputation tend to make their actions including effort more visible and observable to 
tourists. These actions may include handling tourists’ problems promptly, acting in the interest of 
tourists and always being responsible to tourists, all of which send a message to the tourists that 
 ITOs have been devoted a reasonable amount of effort in delivering services. This is consistent 
with List’s (2006) argument that reputation and information are complements. Specifically, a 
firm cannot establish its reputation simply by supplying high quality in a short term because it 
takes time for consumers to learn about quality as well as to be gradually aware of the firm’s 
reputation. Educating consumers in a long run to reduce their information asymmetry in the 
transaction is thus a precondition for firms to build up reputation.  
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